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Summary  
 
This article contributes to the study of “duality” (Breiger, 1974) in social life. Our 
study explores multi-level networks of superposed and partially connected interdependencies, 
the first being inter-organizational, the second inter-individual. We propose a method of 
structural linked design as an articulation for these levels. First, we examine separately the 
complete networks at each level. Second, we combine the two networks in relation to one 
another using systematic information about the membership of each individual in the first 
network (inter-individual) to one of the organizations in the second network (inter-
organizational), as in bipartite networks. This dual-positioning, or the linked design approach, 
is carried out in an empirical study examining performance variations within the “elite” of 
French cancer researchers in 1999. By looking at measures of centrality, we identify the 
actors that these top researchers consider as central or peripheral at the inter-individual level 
(the big and the little fish among the elite), and the laboratories that the research directors 
consider as central or peripheral at the inter-organizational level (the big and the little ponds 
among all the laboratories conducting cancer research in France at that time). In addition to 
the rather trivial report of the competitive advantage of big fish in big ponds (particularly 
because of the advantage of size for laboratories in this field), we use measurements of 
scientific performance to identify “catching up” strategies that the smallest fish use in this 
system. We suggest that this method offers new insights into the duality and multi-level 
dimension of complex systems of interdependencies, and also into the ways in which actors 
manage these interdependencies. We believe that it adds a new dimension to the sociological 
exploration of the determinants of performance, of meso-level phenomena such as 
opportunity structures and institutional change, or of macro-level phenomena such as social 
inequalities.   
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1. Meso-social order and the articulation of systems of superposed interdependencies. 
 
 The fundamental question of the influence of social structure on the behavior and 
performance of actors has been reexamined in recent decades thanks to the development of 
structural sociology and the analysis of social networks. Structural approaches, which 
examine elements of social structure in order to contextualize human action, help with 
detailed reading of systems of interdependencies between actors. Structural models, inspired 
by those proposed by White et al. (1976), remain close to actors, to their interdependent 
relationships, to their positions, and to the interdependent relationships between these 
positions. This provides a basis for systematic meso-sociological analysis.  
 In a parallel manner, statistical models that combine both individual and contextual 
effects in order to calculate the probability of an individual to achieve a given level of 
performance have also experienced, with multi-level analysis, a strong development (Bryk 
and Raudenbush, 1992; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). These models provide a statistical 
approach in which –once the effects of the most obvious determining factors are recognized– 
light is shed on the remaining factors that reveal less obvious properties of behavior and 
performance at the individual level, thanks in particular to interactions effects between pre-
defined levels. However, these models have shown their limits, particularly when sociologists 
find it necessary to identify contextual effects that require some knowledge of the manner in 
which actors themselves perceive or construct their memberships or endogenous social 
differences (Duru-Bellat et al., 2004).  
 In order to further explore the meso-social order and the multi-level dimension of 
social phenomena, this article will follow a structural approach. This approach is different 
from, but complementary to, the now classic statistical approach. It is based on the study of 
the “duality” of social life (Breiger, 1974), in particular of multi-level networks observing two 
systems of superposed and partially interlocked interdependencies, one inter-organizational, 
the other inter-individual. We use the method known, in other areas, as “linked design” 
(Parcel et al., 1991) as a mode of articulation for these two levels. The idea of linked design, 
when applied to network analysis, consists of separately examining each complete network, 
and then combining them thanks to information about the membership of each individual in 
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the first network (inter-individual) to one of the organizations in the second network (inter-
organizational).  
Explorations of the vertical, multi-level dimension of social phenomena following a 
linked-design approach (Lazega et al., 2008) improves knowledge of multi-level conflicts and 
interdependencies, and additionally of the manner in which actors manage these 
interdependencies. Superimposed systems of interdependencies are in fact superimposed 
levels of collective agency, inter-individual and inter-organizational, that must not be 
conflated. Knowledge of multi-level interdependencies, and additionally of the manner in 
which actors manage theses interdependencies, adds an original dimension to multi-level 
reasoning and to meso-level exploration in sociology. Using information on superimposed 
interdependencies, particularly when this positioning is articulated with strategies of actors, it 
is possible to formulate specific hypotheses concerning the relationship between performance 
(measured at the individual level) and dual positioning in a complex structure. The term 
“strategy” refers to the fact that actors manage their interdependencies at different levels by 
appropriating, accumulating, exchanging and sharing resources, both with peers and with 
hierarchical superiors or subordinates. We will observe these strategies by looking at the 
choices of inter-individual and inter-organizational social exchange partners.  
We carry out this approach using empirical data in the sociology of sciences. Our 
illustration is the study of the “elite” of French cancer researchers in 1999, examined at both 
the inter-individual and the inter-organizational levels. In itself, the study of “elites” is not 
new in the sociology of science or in network analysis (see for example Zuckerman, 1977 or 
Hargens et al., 1980). In particular, several studies about complete networks of scientists or 
laboratories have been presented before, beginning with the pioneering work of Mullins et al. 
(1977). Shrum and Mullins (1988), Callon (1989), Cambrosio et al. (2004), Cassier (1998) 
and Jansen (2004) provide literature reviews. Determinants of performance are also widely 
examined in the social network literature (Burt, 2005; Flap et al., 1998, and Sparrowe et al. 
2001, for example). Our contribution is to seek an understanding of these systems of 
superimposed interdependencies, of the strategies of the actors who manage these 
interdependencies, and of their performance measured at the individual level. No 
deterministic order is pre-supposed between position, strategy, and performance, only an 
analytic one. This approach is particularly sensitive to the existence of inequalities between 
competing actors because these inequalities can render a given strategy more or less 
“profitable”, depending on dual positioning as measurement of opportunity structure.  
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2. Dual positioning in the structural contextualization by linked design  
 
 Although the multi-level dimension is intrinsic to the analysis of social networks 
(Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003), the analysis of relationships between structures of different 
levels remains under-developed in structural sociology. As each level constitutes a system of 
exchange between different resources that has its own logic, it is important to examine them 
separately; this is what the main part of the literature does. However, it is also important to 
study the two levels jointly, because joint study allows us to identify opportunity structures 
and the actors that benefit from relatively easy access to the resources that circulate in each 
level, and also to measure their relative performance.  
This way of presenting the problem of contextualizing action and actors’ 
performances echoes the preoccupations of organizational sociologists who reason in terms of 
individual and collective social capital (Leenders and Gabbay, 1999). The most frequently 
cited studies are those that measure or conceptualize the effect of social capital at the 
individual level (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990), the organizational level (Leenders and Gabbay, 
1999), the communitarian level (Putnam, 1993), the industrial level (Walker et al., 1997), or 
the national level (Fukuyama, 1995). But these studies almost never address the more difficult 
question of the integration of different levels of analysis in which they situate social capital. 
 Attempts at solving this problem of joint examination include Breiger’s “dual” 
approach (1974) of bipartite or two-mode networks. When a fixed set of actors belongs to a 
fixed set of organizations, it is possible to derive multiple memberships from inter-individual 
networks (assuming that a connection exists between two individuals because they belong to 
the same organization), and from inter-organizational networks (assuming that a connection 
exists between two organizations because they share common members). The typical example 
is that of “interlock” connections, i.e. connections created between two enterprises when one 
or multiple individuals simultaneously belong to the boards of both enterprises. The networks, 
derived at two different levels, can be reconstituted likewise in a multi-level structure. 
However, this structure provides relatively poor insights into social phenomena because 
relationships are presupposed and symmetrical by construction. 
A second important contribution in multilevel network analysis is that of Fararo and 
Doreian (1984). They generalize Breiger’s and Wilson’s (1982) formalisms in order to craft a 
“formal theory of interpenetration” of distinct entities such as individuals and groups. Seen 
from the perspective of their tripartite structural analysis our approach uses a network (call it 
P) of relations among persons, a network (call it G) of relation among groups, and a network 
(call it A) of affiliations of persons to groups. Unlike in Breiger's (1974) approach, only A is 
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an affiliation network; P and G are networks of social relations and interdependencies (such 
as getting advice from a colleague, or agreements among laboratories to share equipment, 
respectively). Fararo and Doreian's article points out many kinds of relations among levels 
(consider, for example, AGAT, the network of ties between people whose laboratories have 
agreements to share equipment). We use a similar idea below, in particular to reconstitute 
“overlaps” between the two kinds of networks (P and G via A) and reconstitute individual 
strategies of management of resources originating from both levels.  
Finally, a third contribution is that of Hedström et al. (2000). They identify what they 
call meso-level networks by reconstituting the paths of “spatial diffusion” of a growing 
organization, for example a political party’s path to the conquest of an entire country. In the 
case that they study, these meso-level networks are made up of routes borrowed by political 
agitators. These routes accelerate the diffusion of the party’s ideas, and also create local 
representatives by constructing shortcuts for long distances. However, although these routes 
are studied as a system of specific interdependencies and are shown to be critical to the 
growth of this organization, they do not provide precise information about resources that are 
exchanged or transformed at different levels of analysis (jointly at the inter-individual and 
inter-organizational levels). 
 
Figure 1 here  
  
 Figure 1 represents the principle of structural linked design. The upper map represents 
the ties among laboratories carrying out cancer research in France in 1999, in which we 
interviewed the director. Arcs indicate the direction in which the resource flows, in this 
example the direction in which recruitment was operated. For example a laboratory in Lille 
and a laboratory in Dijon recruited a researcher in cancerology coming from a Paris 
laboratory. Another example: a laboratory in Nice recruited a researcher coming from a 
Toulouse laboratory. The lower map represents the ties among researchers whom we 
interviewed. Arcs indicate the direction in which recruitment-related advice was sought 
among researchers in these laboratories. For example, a researcher in Nice sought advice from 
a researcher in Montpellier and from another in Toulouse regarding recruitment for his/her 
research project. Likewise, a researcher in Dijon and a researcher in Lille sought advice from 
a researcher in Paris regarding recruitment. Finally, vertical lines linking nodes in the upper 
map with nodes in the lower map indicate that the individual researcher represented in the 
lower map belongs to the laboratory represented in the upper map (linked design principle). 
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This Figure visualizes, as in Hedström et al. (2000), the value added by the linked 
design approach. One difference between our approach and Hedström et al.’s (2000) 
approach, for example, is that at the top of Hedström et al.'s figure (i.e., the "mesolevel 
network" in their vocabulary) are a series of long-distance linkages (tracing the hypothetical 
travel route of a labor union agitator); in contrast to the long-distance linkages in their meso-
network, their micro-level network is composed entirely of short-distance links (ties of 
sociability) within villages. One could argue that, in our substantive context, the long-distance 
ties (which are conceived by Hedström et al. as necessary to spread diffusion) can be supplied 
either by the laboratories (meso-level) or by individual scientists, especially those of high 
prestige, who have contacts across the (geographical and social) spectrum of research. 
However, as will be shown below, our approach specifies the nature of interactions and 
relationships among individuals and among organizations, which complexifies the nature of 
interdependencies beyond the long-distance/short distance distinction (Lazega and Mounier, 
2002). In contrast with Hedström et al. (2000), structural linked design allows us to specify 
the nature of multiple resource exchanges between different organizations; these are vital 
exchanges for production. From that moment on, individuals are considered as embedded in 
the multi-level relational and organizational opportunity structures that constitute the inter-
organizational context of their actions. 
Thus, the approach proposed here builds upon the above mentioned, but distinguishes 
itself by separately reconstituting systems of interdependencies at least at two different and 
partially interlocked levels of analysis: inter-individual and inter-organizational 
interdependencies. The flow of resources and the specific social exchanges at each level can 
be examined separately at first, and then jointly. This principle of dual-positioning individual 
actors (in the network of their inter-individual relationships and in the network of 
relationships between the organizations to which they belong) has two advantages.   
Firstly, dual positioning allows us to construct a typology of the positions in the 
system, i.e. to characterize individuals and the organizations in which they work in the same 
“dual entity”. Dual positioning corresponds to a form of relative status, or double structural 
characteristic of the individual. It is constructed by measuring both the centrality of the 
individual and the centrality of the organization (in inter-organizational networks) to which he 
or she belongs. In metaphorical terms, the actors are identified, thanks to centrality scores, as 
big or little “fish”; organizations are identified likewise as big or little “ponds.” Belonging to 
one of the four categories that result (big fish in a big pond, big fish in a little pond, etc) 
locates actors in a meso-social space of opportunity structures, simultaneously inter-
individual and inter-organizational.  
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 Secondly, this localization allows us to identify the strategies that individuals use to 
appropriate, to accumulate, and to manage both their own resources and the resources of their 
organizations. Actors vary in their capacity to use organizations and their resources. Certain 
actors use a great deal of the resources of their organization, others much less. In particular, 
systems of interdependencies at different levels are controlled by actors of different 
hierarchical levels. Likewise, we can measure the overlap of relationships between individuals 
by those of their organizations. It then becomes possible to articulate these relational 
strategies to the performance of actors. It is in this respect that the contribution of structural 
linked design is most original. In effect, this design allows us to describe, using the same data 
evoked previously in the discussion of dual positioning, strategies of mobilization and of 
articulation of heterogeneous resources at different levels. As information about the relative 
status of individuals and information about the relational strategies of these individuals are 
used concurrently, we can eventually examine the performance of individuals with 
explanatory variables different from those used in classic ecological analysis –which, to our 
knowledge, rarely measures the position of an actor in systems of interdependencies.  
 In order to use the principle of linked design, we constructed an empirical study by 
simultaneously collecting data about the inter-personal networks of actors dominating a 
specific field, and data about the inter-organizational structure of the same field. The approach 
was carried out in a minimal fashion (and we discuss this limitation in the conclusion) 
because we identified a single member in each organization. Our goal is to identify effects of 
context – and the strategies of actors in these contexts – often overlooked by both classic 
ecological analyses (see for example Firebaugh, 1980), by the analysis of “single-level” 
networks, and even by the analysis of bipartite networks. These effects are due to differences 
in the access to resources and also to the different ways in which actors strategically use 
available resources at both levels.  
 
3. Hypothesis 
 
 The articulation of a position in inter-individual networks within a position in inter-
organizational networks allows us to formulate two expectations concerning relationships 
between duality and the performance of actors. Our hypothesis is that the highest individual 
performances are those of actors who benefit from a central position in both systems of 
interdependencies at the same time, i.e. those who can appropriate, accumulate, and combine 
social resources circulating jointly at the two levels. Metaphorically, the big fish in the big 
ponds should attain the highest levels of performance.  
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 Our second expectation is derived from the idea that dual positioning in itself does not 
mechanically determine performance. There is no absolute determinism regarding the 
relationship between position in the opportunity structure and performance. Performance 
depends on the combined structural characteristics of the organization and the individual, 
because their interdependencies are based on the complementary nature of resources provided 
by each level in order to resolve the problems of individual or collective action. Still, 
individuals have to perform this combination. Strategies used by actors in their management 
of resource interdependencies (localized at different levels) matter as well. We therefore 
expect that strategies used by actors who do not belong to the big fish in the big pond 
category, allow them to catch up to the performance of the big fish in big ponds. Concretely, 
the use of specific strategies for the management of resources –“catching up” strategies– 
should enable those in handicapped positions (relative to the privileged positions of big fish in 
big ponds) to reach the highest levels of performance. At this stage of our exploratory work, 
this expectation remains descriptive and exploratory.  
 It is evident that long-term ascendant (in terms of performance) trajectories cannot be 
explained solely by individual “catching up” strategies. Other variables, such as scientists’ 
phase in the individual career should ideally be included in the discussion. However, our 
exploratory focus in this paper is limited to strategies as explanatory variables, regardless of 
the other reasons for which actors in relatively weak positions can access resources that allow 
them to catch up.  
 
4. All sublime: the case of the small world at the top of French cancer research (1996-
1998) 
   
 These questions make obvious sense in the life of scientific researchers. At each step 
of their work, laboratories provide their members with economic, social, and technical 
resources (Law, 1989; Latour, 2001). For example, when a new researcher arrives at a 
laboratory, he or she benefits from established cooperative relationships between the 
laboratory and other laboratories, and also from the reputation and the networks of its 
director. Regular institutional budgets and funds raised for specific scientific projects 
represent obvious causal factors for individual performance, and, in the end, for obtaining 
high impact factor scores. Therefore, performance may simultaneously depend on the 
characteristics of the laboratory, including its position in the network of exchanges between 
laboratories, and on the characteristics of individuals, including their positions in the network 
of exchanges between them. Likewise, performance may depend on the combined structural 
10 
 
characteristics of the laboratory and the researcher because their interdependencies are based 
on the complementary nature of resources provided by each level.  
 These ideas are tested through empirical research on a population, which we call an 
“elite,” of French cancer researchers at the end of the 1990s. The following section briefly 
describes the manner in which we selected the population, collected the data, and studied this 
milieu.  
 
Population and data  
This elite was identified by the number of articles published in scientific journals 
between 1996 and 1998. The numbers are based on the Cancerlit database of the US National 
Library of Medicine. The criterion used was a threshold of 25 papers over the period of two 
and a half years. The list of scientists that we constructed and used includes different types of 
actors: those who publish heavily, those who co-publish heavily, and those who are present in 
the list of authors because they provide technical help or because they run the laboratory. 
Careers and scientific production are not uniform (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina et 
al., 1980; Barber, 1990). To take these variations into account, we have enlarged the 
examined population by lowering, as much as our resources permitted, the threshold of the 
number of publications –our selection criterion– so that both researchers at the beginning of 
their careers and those at the end remain on the list. This approach produced a list of 168 
researchers who constituted, at a given period, what we consider the elite of cancer 
researchers in France. The data from Cancerlit show that French researchers published 9149 
articles between 1996 and the first six months of 1998. These articles were signed by 24285 
different researchers. Following “Lotka’s law” (Lotka, 1926; Price, 1963), the vast majority 
of researchers working on a specific problem only publish one article about the problem. A 
very small minority of scientists, more prolific, publish the majority of their articles in a 
specific domain. In this list, we have selected precisely those who have published the most in 
this domain, in France during this period. 
Among the 168 researchers, 128 persons (76%) accepted an interview. Few important 
(internationally recognized) names are missing from our work. The majority of people 
missing are not very central in the relational networks of their French colleagues. The 
information in Cancerlit shows that during the 1990s French cancer researchers published 
about 3800 articles directly related to cancer each year, over a total of 80000 worldwide. The 
128 persons interviewed obviously did not publish 3800 articles alone each year for two and a 
half years. These articles were published with several, even many coauthors. However, these 
128 persons signed more than 3200. This is therefore a population of researchers that each has 
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sufficient status to put cooperative projects into place, to run them, and eventually to sign the 
work of others, including post-docs.  
After identifying in Cancerlit the individuals who publish the most, we constructed a 
measure of actor performance. The construction of this measure is based on the impact factor 
of the journals in which each researcher has published. Technically, we proceeded in the 
following manner: if a researcher published four articles in a journal, the impact factor score 
of this journal was multiplied by four. The impact factor scores of all the publications of each 
individual were calculated likewise and summed for each individual. We did not take into 
account whether the researcher publishes alone or with a group: each person mentioned as a 
co-author in an article receives the same score. We could have divided the impact factor score 
between co-authors, but in our opinion this procedure seemed more problematic because we 
do not have information concerning who did what for each article. Given this choice for the 
calculation of individual impact factor scores, each individual beneficiates from the impact 
factor of the journals in which he/she publishes. This approach is appropriate in a milieu in 
which status competition is one of the strong motivations of actors. It could be vulnerable to 
strategies in which actors would voluntarily and systematically co-sign the same articles, thus 
"inflating" together and artificially their respective score. In our context, however, given the 
existence of a sophisticated division of work and status competition in each specialty, 
members of this elite published very little together. The density of the copublication matrix in 
this elite is 0.04. If this "inflation" strategy is quite easily carried out for mutual citations, it is 
much less easy to carry out for copublications.  
The correlation between the two measures (the number of publications and the impact 
factor scores of the individual’s publications) is 0.37. These results depend on the hierarchy of 
journals and disciplines such as it is defined by the system that evaluates articles in American 
institutions. The journals that have the highest impact factor scores (Nature, Science, etc.) are 
those that receive the most media attention. Technical and specialized publications can be 
more widely read by scientists even if they do not have comparably high impact factor scores. 
These bibliometric choices have certainly been criticized (Fox, 1983; Long, 1978; Mulkay, 
1972; Reskin, 1977, Seglen, 1992, 1997), but one can suppose that they apply uniformly to 
the specialties examined here. In addition, if there exists a bias –in this system of evaluation– 
against publications in non-Anglo-Saxon journals, we assume that all French researchers are 
affected by this bias in a uniform manner, allowing at least comparisons between French 
researchers. This technique identified the most productive and the most “visible” authors 
during the course of the two and a half years considered in this study. A third of the 
publications of the members on this list are co-publications with non-French researchers.  
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Following the strategy of structural linked design, we tried to interview all the 
directors of the laboratories to which these researchers belong. In total, we interviewed (face 
to face) 82 laboratory directors in the system of French cancer research. In 51 of the 128 
cases, the selected researcher is also the director of his/her laboratory; these persons agreed to 
two interviews (one as a researcher, one as a laboratory director) and responded to the two 
questionnaires. Insofar as, for various reasons, some directors of laboratory were interviewed 
but not the researcher in their laboratory, or the researcher but not the director, we are left 
with 93 researcher/director "pairs". Thus, the number of researchers that we are able, thanks 
to our structural linked design, to position in the dual system of superposed interdependencies 
is finally 93. All further network results at either level refer to the networks formed by these 
93 nodes.   
Next, the networks of interdependencies in France in 1999 were reconstituted. First, 
the inter-organizational networks between the majority of laboratories engaged in cancer 
research; second, the advice networks constructed by members of the "elite." This was done 
in the following manner. At the individual level, each researcher is considered a “scientific 
entrepreneur” who needs resources that may be social or monetary. From the individual 
researcher’s point of view, research may be analytically broken down into five steps, 
beginning with the definition of a line of research and ending with the publication of scientific 
articles. Scientific work has thus been reduced analytically to a sequence of five steps, each 
one characterized by a strong degree of uncertainty: selecting a line of research, finding 
institutional support, finding sources of financing, recruiting personnel, and publishing 
articles. At each step, one must suppose that the researchers depend upon their relational 
capital and that they seek advice from other members of the research community in order to 
handle these uncertainties. In this competitive and uncertain environment, access to advisors 
is an important resource because carrying out these tasks is facilitated by access to advice 
offered by competent colleagues who agree to help.  
In order to reconstitute, at least partially, the resulting system of interdependencies 
among actors at the inter-individual level (within the elite), we asked the actors to identify 
those from whom, in the list of cancer researchers presented to them, they sought advice to 
handle these challenges at each step of the way. It was thus possible to reconstitute one advice 
network per step: one network dealing with choices about the direction of projects, one for 
helping to find institutional support, one for handling financial resources, one helping with 
recruitment, and finally one network of colleagues to whom researchers send their 
manuscripts for advice before submitting them to journals.  
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The image of the scientific research process reflected in this sequence is obviously 
over-simplified, but qualitative interviews showed that researchers considered these social 
resources essential, at least in the French institutional context. Scientific research 
organizations more generally do not ignore relational life when evaluating the work of 
researchers. In the decision to attribute research funds in the United States, for example, 
institutions such as the National Science Foundation are increasingly and systematically 
taking social criteria into account. Laboratories’ capacity to produce post-docs who 
subsequently build teams is increasingly measured by a special module attached to application 
forms. Other data were also collected about the researchers themselves, their attributes, their 
performances, and their opinions in several domains.  
 At the inter-organizational level, we also collected systematic data about inter-
laboratory networks and about laboratories characteristics. The laboratory directors indicated 
with which other laboratories, among those in France practicing cancer research, their 
laboratory exchanged different types of resources. The list of reconstituted transfers and 
exchanges includes the recruitment of post-docs and researchers, the development of 
programs of joint research, joint responses to tender offers, sharing of technical equipment, 
sharing of experimental material, mobility of administrative personnel, and invitations to 
conferences and seminars. The complete inter-organizational network examined here is the 
aggregated and dichotomized network of all these flows; dichotomization created a tie 
between two actors if there was at least one tie between them in one of the aggregated 
matrices.   
To summarize, at the inter-individual level, five advice networks are aggregated and 
dichotomized to reconstitute a complete network of density 0.06 with average degree 8.8. In 
this network, reciprocation rate is 0.36, and the number of transitive triads (n=69) is lower 
than expected by chance (n=181). Likewise, the inter-organisational network reaches a 
density of 0.04 with average degree of 6; reciprocation rate is 0.39 and the number of 
transitive triads (n=102) is higher than expected by chance (n=32). 
 The reconstitution of this dual system of interdependencies at two levels allows us to 
test our hypothesis and more exploratory expectations. The position of each individual actor 
in this dual system of interdependencies is provided by describing, in each observed network, 
centrality scores for both the individual researchers (in the advice networks of the elite to 
which they belong), and the laboratories in which they work (based on the inter-
organizational networks reconstituted in interviews with the laboratory directors). This meso-
social positioning measures access to numerous resources, and therefore to performance 
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capacity measured at the individual level, i.e. the impact factor score associated with articles 
published by each member of this population.  
 
Hierarchy and Compartmentalization of Specialties   
 This short section provides some information about the context of French cancer 
research in 1999 to recognize the importance of the variables that will be used to establish 
patterns of individual performance. This discipline brings together a great number of sub-
specialties; each sub-specialty focuses on a different organ of the human body and represents 
a specific scientific sub-culture. French oncology is a young discipline (Lemaine et al., 1976) 
in which research is dominated, during this period, by studies in hematology-immunology. 
The latter sub-specialty is well-organized, prestigious, and recognized by the general public. 
For several generations, it has benefited from considerable institutional investments. It has 
been the first in French cancer research to use collectively the methods of molecular biology 
(Lazega et al., 2004). In addition, as explained by one of the laboratory directors of our 
population at the time, “(…) the problems that leukemia poses are relatively simple: the 
tumors are clonal, you find pure molecular events there. Hematologists consequently recruited 
sharp molecular biologists very quickly. Solid tumors are infinitely more complex; right now 
they are starting to become accessible to intellectual work and to fundamental research”. 
 At the end of the 1990s, research was principally financed by public funds – in 
national research institutes (called CNRS, INSERM) or in generalist or specialized research 
hospitals – and by private foundations. Research is strongly concentrated in the Paris region, 
in terms of resources, number of researchers, and also in terms of publications. A separation 
between clinical research and fundamental research adds to a division into sub-specialties and 
to a certain weakness of “mixed” or “transfer” research in a domain nevertheless dominated 
by the medical profession and social practices of hospitals. Of the 128 researchers 
interviewed, 20 state involvement in purely fundamental research (15%), 47 in clinical 
research (36%), and 58 in both fundamental and clinical research (45%). Table 1 presents an 
overview of the variables used in the models below. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
  
Median size of laboratories was close to 26 researchers. Half of these laboratories were 
located in the Paris region. The largest part of their financial resources (in 1999) came from 
their institutional budget, followed by support from non profit organizations (Association 
pour la recherche sur le cancer, Ligue contre le cancer, etc.) and private (pharmaceutical) 
15 
 
companies. Average age in this population was 48. 44% declared doing fundamental research, 
45% "laboratory research", 28% haematology/immunology, 45% research on solid tumors 
(compared with 8% doing research in surgery and 15% in epidemiology and public health). 
The great majority are MDs (70%), professors (81%), and members of scientific (73%) or 
editorial (51%) boards. Almost half are PhDs in science (44%) and work in University 
hospitals (54%). The average score of impact factor for their publications was 85.3 (in 1999). 
 Not surprisingly (Hargens et al., 1980), as will be shown below, the “small world” at 
the top of French cancer research is stratified (Lazega et al., 2006). An oligarchy consisting of 
roughly thirty people (most of who belong to the category that will be labeled below the “Big 
Fish in the Big Pond”) controls the circulation of resources in inter-individual and inter-
organizational networks. These “oligarchs” are often directors of a unit, and between 40 and 
56 years of age. As in other areas of scientific research, middle-aged actors are key actors of 
the system (Zuckerman and Merton, 1972; Cole, 1979). They also work more frequently in 
institutions situated in Ile-de-France (i.e. in and around Paris) than the other researchers 
interviewed. They are usually professors of medicine, and, with the exception of three among 
them (who identify themselves with pure fundamental research), they are involved in clinical 
research or in both clinical and fundamental research. As expected from the literature (Crane, 
1972; Hagstrom, 1965), different kinds of homophilous social preferences, as well as formal 
or informal markers of compartmentalization, characterize the interactions between the 
members of this population. Clinicians and professors of medicine, for example, have a 
tendency to cite amongst themselves (as sources of advice) more often than they cite 
fundamental researchers (Lazega et al., 2006).  
 Research laboratories are connected by the proximity of their research topics and by 
mutual surveillance resulting from competition among them. But they are also connected by 
scientific exchanges, and by the sharing of materials in complex configurations that combine 
disciplines, localization, and institutional membership. The units that exchange the most 
include the researchers who obtain the highest impact factor scores. We also find, at the level 
of laboratories, effects of preferences: laboratories specializing in fundamental research 
exchange more with laboratories of the same specialty and the same institutional affiliation. 
By contrast, they do not exchange more with laboratories in the same geographic location 
(notably because of the existence of research programs designed, in part, to bring together 
Parisians and residents of the provinces).    
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5. Positioning of actors in systems of superposed interdependencies  
 
To carry out this multi-level approach, we measured the status of actors and 
organizations in the following manner. The status of an actor is measured by his/her indegree 
centrality in the advice network of the research elite. Centralities used in this article are 
indegrees and outdegrees. We use these measurements of centrality because we use incoming 
and outgoing ties further below in our measurement of overlap between the relationships of 
the researcher and that of laboratories. This provides a uniform basis for the interpretation of 
our results in the reconstitution of strategies of mobilization and articulation of heterogeneous 
resources at different levels. We do not think of this choice as an intrinsic limitation of our 
approach, although further research should be devoted to the possibility of using other kinds 
of measurement of centralities or of combining several different kinds at different levels. The 
central values used as reference values for the classification of individuals and laboratories are 
in Table 1. The distribution of some variables being skewed, we used the median value for 
comparisons. 
The status of the organization is measured by three criteria: its indegree centrality in 
inter-organizational networks, its outdegree centrality (indicating the potential resources to 
which its director declares having access), and its size (measured by the number of 
researchers). We looked at whether each laboratory was above or below the median value in 
each of these three criteria. We considered a laboratory to be a “big pond” if its values were 
above the median for at least two of these criteria.  
This produces an endogenous partition of the population into four classes. This 
partition allows for an initial use of the structural linked design to characterize and 
differentiate the researchers and laboratories that belong to each class. The four classes 
obtained are baptized metaphorically for a more intuitive understanding of this dual 
positioning. The construction of the four classes positioning actors at the meso level used the 
following thresholds : in order to be considered a Big Fish in a Big Pond, the researcher’s 
indegree centrality must be higher than 5.2, that of the laboratory higher than 2.75 ; the 
laboratory’s outdegree must be higher than 2 and its size higher than 26 researchers. The same 
thresholds are used for the three other categories (Big Fish in a Little Pond, etc.). As our 
population is elite, even the researchers that we call “Little Fish in Little Pond” are 
researchers at an exceptional level.  
a. Big Fish in Big Ponds (BFBP): In this first class, the researchers’ prestige, social 
resources, number of publications and impact factor scores are higher than the median. The 
size, indegree and outdegree of their laboratory are higher than the median. The majority of 
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these researchers are directors of laboratories, aging on average 48 years, and conducting 
fundamental research in solid tumors and hematology-immunology. The majority are 
simultaneously doctors (MDs) and scientists (PhDs), tenured research directors in national 
research institutions, usually heads of hospital services, and almost all University professors. 
In addition, most are members of scientific and editorial committees. The laboratories to 
which these big fish belong are large in size, more central than others in inter-laboratory 
exchanges, and most often located in Ile-de-France. Most carry out fundamental research and 
have European-level funding. The specialties of the researchers and the specialties of the 
laboratory are always the same. Nevertheless, this class is not entirely homogenous.   
b. Big Fish in Little Ponds (BFLP): In this second class, the researchers’ prestige and their 
social resources are also higher than the median. However the size, indegree and outdegree of 
their laboratory are lower than the median. This class is smaller in terms of the number of 
researchers (16) and laboratories. Its researchers, like those in class 1, are prestigious by 
definition. Like the members of class 1, the BFLP also benefit from resources superior to the 
median. On the other hand, they differ from the BFBP because their impact factor score is 
weak, despite the fact that they publish a large number of articles. They are both MDs, 
agrégés (a special kind of French elite), directors of research units in hospitals, and generally 
younger than the BFBP. They tend to specialize in laboratory research and in hematology. In 
general, there is little correspondence or alignment between the specialties of their 
laboratories and their own individual research; this constitutes a clear contrast with the class 
of BFBP. Very few belong to editorial boards (unlike the BFBP) and they teach less than the 
others. Their laboratories are small and located in Ile-de-France. In the domain of cancer 
research, they have less prestige and fewer inter-organizational resources than those in class 1. 
Their financial resources are largely limited to their institutional budgets. This class is more 
heterogeneous than the BFBP class.  
c. Little Fish in Big Ponds (LFBP): In this third class, the researchers’ prestige is lower than 
the median. Size, indegree and outdegree of their laboratory are higher than the median. This 
class is composed of 22 researchers among whom almost no one is a laboratory director. The 
average age in this group is lower than the median. The LFBP are engaged in both 
fundamental and laboratory research that is strongly aligned with the specialties of the 
laboratories in which they work. Without much prestige or access to resources, they have 
nevertheless relatively high impact factor scores. It is in this class that we find the most PhDs, 
the fewest MDs, and the fewest University professors. With respect to formal status, an equal 
number are research directors and simple researchers, and few belong to scientific or editorial 
committees. Their laboratories are generally located in the provinces. They have very diverse 
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financial resources, including European-level funding. In comparison with other classes, we 
find here a greater number of laboratories working on solid tumors (a domain that had just 
become more accessible to fundamental research at the time) and using European financing. 
d. Little Fish in Little Ponds (LFLP): In this forth class, the researchers’ prestige and social 
resources are lower than the median. The size, indegree and outdegree of their laboratory are 
also lower than the median. The majority of this class is composed of laboratory directors 
whose average age is higher than the median. They work in more heterogeneous specialties, 
but are nevertheless aligned with the specialties of their laboratories (which they have 
probably founded and defined). They are often MDs, agrégés, heads of service at their 
hospitals and University professors. Few belong to scientific or editorial committees. An 
equal number work in laboratories in Ile-de-France as in the provinces. These laboratories are 
heterogeneous in terms of size, specialty, access to European funding, and number of 
publications.  
This dual positioning and the stratification that is derived from it raise the question of 
relationships between classes. Is the advantage of size combined, in this scientific milieu, with 
closure, or a picket fence around the BFBP category? Linked design offers a way to answer 
this question. A graphic inspection of inter-individual networks in each class, presented in 
Figures 2 and 3, as well as the measurement of intra and inter-class densities presented in 
Table 2, show that the density of inter-class relations drops with the centrality of laboratories 
and also with the centrality of researchers, with very marked thresholds separating the big fish 
from the smallest fish in this elite population. Intra-class density is higher among BFBP than 
among LFLP. In Figure 3, intra class ties represented in Figure 2 are not included and 
members of each focal class are in black. The density of inter-class ties is higher between 
BFBPs and all others than between LFLP and all others. Thus these figures show a strong 
difference between big fishes and little fishes for outgoing and incoming ties, a difference that 
will become important further below when we show that, in spite of the fact that differences 
between contexts are smaller than differences between individuals, access to resources (and 
upward mobility chances for researchers in terms of impact factor scores) is more shaped by 
the contexts (big ponds versus small ponds) and by the strategies of individuals than by their 
characteristics.  
 
– Figures 2 and 3, and Table 2 here –  
 
This visualization of the individual actors’ networks is interesting because it confirms our 
results above by showing the importance of laboratory size and centrality. Relationships 
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between classes come from the fact that the researchers in other categories seek advice from 
the BFBP, and also because laboratories in the other categories actively exchange with the 
laboratories of the BFBP. Nevertheless, a relatively large proportion of this centrality comes 
from internal (i.e. endogamous) choices. We see clearly that the BFBP have more 
relationships than the others, both with each other and with those in other categories. The 
network of the top of the small world of elites in this discipline is not closed, but it is 
considerably more open to the LFBP than to colleagues in the little ponds. Inter-individual 
advice flows are dominated more strongly by fish category than by pond category.  
As our approach is not deterministic, we ask now, following our expectations, the 
following question: what are the strategies and performances characterizing each category?  
 
6. Can the Little Fish compete? The complex connection between multi-level position 
and performance measured at the individual level 
  
 All the researchers in this elite population are high performers in terms of the number 
of published articles. However, as shown by Figure 4, the BFBP have the highest impact 
factor scores. Figure 4 presents boxplots showing the level and dispersion of impact factors of 
the researchers of each class. 50% of researchers of each class are included in the rectangle. 
The threshold in the box indicates the median value of impact factors for the class.  
 
– Figure 4 about here –  
 
Fundamental research journals are the most interesting in terms of their contribution in 
impact factor scores. In order to do fundamental research, laboratories must be large in size. 
Working in large laboratories enables researchers to quickly find a given plasmid or a given 
cell that would take weeks to bring in from elsewhere. As formulated by a laboratory director 
in our population, “if you don’t have a critical mass and everything in hand, you aren’t in the 
fast lane. Unplugging the freezers is a very efficient way to bring a laboratory doing 
fundamental research to its knees. Sometimes, it takes years to reconstitute the stocks 
necessary for that kind of research”. Fundamental researchers have less administrative 
responsibilities and probably sign their own research. Located primarily in Ile-de-France, 
they work in specialties generating high impact factor scores (hematology in particular). Our 
first hypothesis is thus confirmed.  
Due to the advantage of sheer size in these domains, there are twice as many big fish in 
big ponds than in little ponds. However, each of the four classes, even that of the BFBP, is 
20 
 
heterogeneous in terms of performance. The relationship between position and performance 
is neither linear nor simple. One finds very high performances in other classes, for example 
in the class of the LFBP. The BFLP often have a weak impact factor score, despite the fact 
that they publish a large number of articles. This class probably consists, in part, of 
laboratory directors who sign articles based on the work of younger researchers. In addition, 
few in the LFLP class, who are often also the oldest members of the population, have an 
impact factor score superior to the median at the time of this study. Many of them are 
directors of small, personal laboratories with relatively little prestige and weak social 
resources. Note, however, that in this classification we also need to make a special place for 
individuals with atypical profiles. Some leading experts with high reputations appear as 
LFBP because our analysis is based on the median and because they have not published 
exclusively in cancer research. In other disciplines, they would appear as BFBPs.  
These results suggest that an organizational explanation may be highly relevant with 
regard to performance. For example, in big laboratories (those in which fundamental research 
is conducted with European-level funding), there are less disparities between the specialties 
of researchers and those of the organization as a whole. As already mentioned, the BFBP, in 
contrast with other members of the elite, have specialties perfectly aligned with those of their 
laboratories. The complementary relationship between the resources of the laboratory and 
those of researchers seems more rationalized. 
This organizational explanation leads to our second expectation. There should be 
strategies for the management of resource interdependencies at two different levels, followed 
by actors in categories other than the BFBP (the BFLP and the Little Fish) that would allow 
them to catch up (in terms of impact factor scores) to the BFBP. At this stage, a question 
remains: in what terms should we examine these strategies? Here, the richness of the data on 
multi-level networks through linked design allows us go beyond an analysis based mainly on 
centralities. In order to examine the more or less cumulative character of the resources of 
actors and organizations, our structural linked design allows us to use the choices of inter-
individual and inter-organizational exchange partners as indicators of these strategies. In 
order to identify and to classify these strategies, it is necessary to combine the data of 
interpersonal networks and those of inter-organizational networks. 
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7. Beyond the advantage of sheer size: Strategies of actors in the management of 
individual and collective resources 
 
 Actors who must manage interdependencies at different levels choose ways to 
appropriate, accumulate, exchange or share resources with their hierarchical superiors, their 
peers and their subordinates. These ways are reflected in strategies of articulation of the two 
levels (individual and collective), through the addition and the adjustment of different 
resources (economic and functional as well as social and cognitive) flowing at these levels. In 
this section we discuss these issues in two parts. First, we examine the typology of these 
strategies, and second, the link between multi-level position and strategies.  
 The connection existing between membership to a class and strategies for the 
management of interdependencies can be read in the overlap between the researcher’s 
relationships and those of his/her laboratory, for outgoing as well as incoming ties. Figure 5 
illustrates these overlaps.  
 
-Figure 5 about here- 
 
A researcher may be cited (in these advice networks) by colleagues belonging to a 
laboratory that may or may not have inter-organizational ties with his/her laboratory. The 
comparison of differences between these two types of relationships provides indications about 
the level of overlap between the two kinds of networks and about the behavior of these actors 
in their organization, thus offering indicators for their strategies. We interpret choices 
received as indicators, for the laboratories, of their importance from a functional point of 
view, and, for researchers, as indicators of prestige in terms of professional authority. We 
interpret outgoing ties as indicators of access. In the case of the laboratories, outgoing ties can 
be read as measures of access to exterior resources; for the researchers, they measure access 
to sources of learning and of personal support. 
Figure 5 shows ten types of overlap between ties of researchers and ties of their 
respective laboratories. A researcher may have a set of contacts contributing to his/her 
indegree (we call it prestige), and another set of contacts constituting his/her outdegree (we 
call it access to resources). In Figure 5, codes 1, 4, 7 refer to a weak overlap between the 
relationships of a researcher and those of his/her laboratory. Code 10 refers to a situation in 
which there is no overlap at all: choices received by the actor come from colleagues who do 
not belong to the laboratories collaborating with the laboratory of this actor. For incoming 
choices, this is a situation in which the individual researcher enjoys a personal prestige 
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relatively independent from the prestige of his/her laboratory. For outgoing ties, this is a 
situation in which the individual researcher has access to resources relatively independently 
from his/her laboratory. Codes 2, 5 and 8 refer to an important overlap and codes 3, 6 and 9 to 
a maximum overlap:  the actor has access to advice related resources (learning) from sources 
offered by the collaborations established at the level of his/her laboratory. 
 Using this typology, we can establish a correspondence between class (identified 
above: BFBP, etc.) and level of overlap. As shown in Figure 6, one may differentiate the 
strategies that result from these combinations into four categories.  
 
-Figure 6 about here- 
 
Firstly, there are combinations that articulate little (or no) common prestige and little (or no) 
joint access to the same organizational resources: combinations 1 and 5 and combinations 4 
and 8. One could call these combinations “independent” strategies. It is not difficult to 
imagine concrete examples of behavior that reflect independent strategies. For example, a 
researcher representing an entire discipline in a scientific council might negotiate, in the name 
of the collective interest that he/she represents, to obtain resources for his/her own individual 
projects. Second, there are combinations that articulate little (or no) shared prestige but many 
or all of the common resources: combinations 2 and 6 and combinations 3 and 7. One could 
call these combinations “individualist” strategies (benefiting from common resources but not 
sharing their prestige). Third, there are combinations that articulate a great deal of shared 
prestige but little (or no) common organizational resources: combinations 9 and 13 and 
combinations 12 and 16. One could call these combinations “collectivist” strategies 
(constructing common prestige by using different resources than one’s colleagues’). Fourth, 
there are combinations that articulate a great deal of shared prestige and common 
organizational resources: combinations 10 and 14, and also combinations 11 and 15. On could 
call these combinations “fusional” strategies. The reconstitution of these strategies allows us 
to examine the behaviors of big or little fish, in big or little ponds. In addition, it allows us to 
test our second hypothesis about the relationship between position, strategy, and performance.  
 In sum, a researcher may have a set of contacts contributing to his/her indegree (we 
call it prestige), and another set of contacts constituting his/her outdegree (we call it 
resources). Comparing the differences between the two sets of contacts suggests the existence 
of specific relational behaviour and provides indications about the researcher’s strategy 
(independent, individualist, collectivist or fusional) of management of resources flowing in 
the observed networks. As each researcher and each laboratory belongs to a class, it is 
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possible to examine the correspondence between class and strategy. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of strategies in each class. Figure 7 presents a correspondence analysis based on 
Table 3. 
   
- Table 3 and Figure 7 about here – 
 
Figure 7 and Table 3 show that all classes are characterized by mixed strategies. Only the 
LFLP use a narrower range of strategies (0% fusional strategies). Nevertheless, certain 
strategies may be dominant, and may help to explain in part the performances of actors in 
relation to their position in the multi-level system. In effect, the uses of the organization and 
its resources vary from one class to another. In the BFBP class, overlaps of relationships 
between researchers with relationships between their laboratories are the greatest; it is also in 
this class where independent strategies are among the least frequent (24% in Table 3). In 
addition, the largest percentage of fusional strategies are found among the BFLP (36%); 
complete independence of individuals and institutions, especially with regard to prestige but 
also with regard to more functional resources, is relatively rare in this category. In Figure 7, 
the ellipses represent only the most important trends. For example even if dimension 1 
explains much more than dimension 2, and even if the LFBP are very close to the 
individualist strategy in that projection, they are even closer to the independent strategy.    
 More generally, collectivist strategies characterize big fish more often than their small 
counterparts. In other words, the bigger the fish, the greater the overlap between the 
relationships of researchers and the relationships of their respective laboratories. Big fish 
know how, and are able, to use the resources of their laboratory. Among the LFBP, the 
majority have strongly independent strategies. On the other hand, for the LFLP, one finds a 
nearly complete separation between the relationships of researchers and those of laboratories, 
whether for outgoing or incoming ties. Among the 93 individuals, 41 have a personal network 
(including other members of the research elite) in which there is no overlap with the 
laboratory network (such as reconstituted by its director). Their laboratories may also offer 
resources to which they do not have direct access or that they do not use. The LFLP have no 
fusional strategies.  
Big fish do not seem more prone to use individualist strategies than little fish. The 
only marked difference is the more frequent use of collectivist strategies, but also of fusion 
strategies (although in very small numbers). The difference in the use of independent 
strategies is not so much between the little fish and/or little pond as the column percentages 
show, but between the little and the big fish. Little fish –perhaps for the reason of less access 
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to laboratory resources– much more often follow an independent strategy (66% compared to 
34% of big fishes). Also it is not the BFBP that most often use collectivist and fusional 
strategies, but the BFLP; they are more often the directors and can easily use the resources of 
the laboratory for their own interest.  
 Given these results, it is now time to determine under what conditions these 
independent or individualist strategies are rewarding in terms of impact factor scores for the 
researchers who are not BFBP. 
 
8. Catching up strategies for the Little Fish?  
  
 We measure the way in which actors’ strategies are associated with performance 
levels for researchers who are not BFBP, i.e. who are endowed with less social resources. In 
effect, we cannot exclude that strategies of appropriation of resources –stemming from 
different levels (individual and collective) – constitute a form of rationalization that allows for 
catching up in these opportunity structures. The examination of the evolution of the impact 
factor scores of all the researchers, and more specifically of those catching up, over five 
consecutive years following the study, allows us to identify “long-term catching up”. In 
effect, until now, we have considered impact factor scores from three years: 1996, 1997, and 
1998. In order to measure the evolution of all the researchers’ scores, we also gathered 
information for the five following years: 2000 to 2004. In order to compare these two periods 
(as the number of years is different), the mean for scores in the first period is 28.4; the mean 
for scores in the second period is 38.4. Thus, the general mean of impact factor scores rose by 
about 10 points, an evolution rate of 36%. Impact factor at time 1 and impact factor at time 2 
are both normally distributed. 
Can membership in a class and the use of a strategy be associated with and, at least in 
part, “explain” the evolution of impact factors? Neither class membership nor strategy are 
necessarily equivalent with weak or strong impact factors. Because the number of cases 
observed in order to analyze these catching up strategies is low, it is best to ensure the 
robustness of these propositions by verifying that the users of these strategies are (or are not) 
on an ascendant trajectory –in terms of the accumulation of impact factor point scores– over 
the five years following the field study (2000 to 2004). Tables 4a, 4b and 4c present 
respectively the standardized means of impact factor scores at each period for the whole 
population, for the sub-population whose scores increased between the two periods, and for 
the subpopulation whose scores decreased between the two periods.   
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-Tables 4a, 4b and 4c about here- 
 
Comparing the two distributions (t1 and t2) of Table 4a shows that members of seven 
categories of researchers increased their scores. All classes in table 4a show some strategies 
that yielded an improvement in relative scores: BFBP with an independent and a fusional 
strategy; BFLP with a collectivist and fusional one; LFBP with an individualist and 
collectivist strategy; and LFLP with an individualist one.  
For the interpretation of the relationship between Table 4a and the tables on the sub-
population that increased its scores (Table 4b) and the sub-population that suffered from 
decreasing scores (Table 4c), it should be stressed that the data in Table 4b and 4c are 
standardized using different means and standard deviations than in Table 4a. Each sub-
population has its own mean and standard deviation. This is the reason for which there are 
minus cases in a sub-population that is defined by upward mobility and vice versa for the 
downward mobile sub-population.   
Tables 4b and 4c are simple descriptions of what the strategies per classes for the 
upward / downward mobile sub-populations were. Table 4b shows that 46 researchers saw 
their scores increase between the two periods. This is especially the case for LFBP (but also 
for the LFLP). Notice that the mean, for the first period for researchers whose scores 
increased, is lower than the general mean of the whole population for that same period, 
whereas the opposite is true for the second period. This difference means that the researchers 
who progressed the most between the two periods are not, in general, the researchers who had 
the best scores during the first period. The degree of relative upward change in this sub-
population is much higher for the little fish than for the big fish. Only the LFBP can improve 
their relative positions. On average, researchers who saw their scores increase the most profit 
from individualist strategies. 
Among the 47 researchers whose impact factor scores decreased (Table 4c), one can 
identify the classes and strategies with the “lowest” performances in this elite. Among those 
whose scores decreased the most, we find the BF with an individualist and an independent 
strategy. The strategies that harm the most the LFBP of the downward group are the 
independent and collectivist strategies. In addition, collectivist / fusional strategies, on 
average, mitigate the decrease of their scores.  
Figure 8 provides a correspondence analysis that summarizes the main results of Table 
4a.   
 
-Figure 8 about here- 
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Figure 8 shows the existence of strategies that help catching up, especially for some sub-
populations (among those who are not BFBP) whose strategies contribute, over time, to the 
increase in impact factor scores. We consider three categories of performance: researchers 
with increasing, decreasing or stable impact factors between the first and the second period. 
We considered that, in order to be in the decreasing category, the difference between their 
standardized IF scores must be inferior to -0.1; in order to be in the increasing category, the 
difference between their standardized IF scores must be superior to 0.1; and in order to be in 
the stable category, the difference between their standardized IF scores must be between -0.1 
and 0.1. The correspondence analysis is realized on these three categories and the eleven 
groups of researchers (from the independent BFLP to the collectivist LFLP). It uses the 
number of researchers in each group. In Figure 8, the two hexagons give meaning to the first 
dimension, the two ellipses to second dimension. One can also identify two additional sets (in 
rectangles): the first is close to the increasing category, the second to the decreasing category. 
Among researchers with increasing IF scores, the individualist strategy seems efficient 
for the LFLP. It is not always necessary for these elite researchers to be in a big pond in order 
to have a chance to catch up. To say that the individualist strategy was the only strategy that 
gave the little fish the ability to catch up in the system of cancer research as it existed in 1999 
remains nevertheless an oversimplification. The same individualist strategy seems to be 
counterproductive for the BFLP. BFLP do not deny themselves the advantages that their 
status in the laboratory offers, even if the resources they can appropriate in their non-central 
laboratories are insufficient to catch up to the BFBP. One might also easily imagine that a 
BFLP can attain very high levels of performance (measured at the individual level) if he/she 
is the only one in the little pond to be able to appropriate the necessary resources and enter 
competition with the BFBP.  
The collectivist strategy seems also efficient for the BFLP, who also benefit from a 
fusional strategy. Following an independent strategy does not seem to benefit anyone in the 
figure. Among researchers with decreasing IF scores, the independent strategy seems to 
characterize the three groups: the LFLP, LFBP and BFLP. The latter with an individualist 
strategy have decreasing scores. Among researchers with stable IF scores, we find the LFLP 
with more sharing strategies. The other strategies do not appear to contribute to the increase 
or decrease, over time, of the researchers’ scores, and are therefore not shown. It should be 
reminded that, in each class, several individuals see their scores increase between the two 
periods; but these increases are often not sufficient to reach, in the second period, a score that 
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is high enough above the new standardized mean of their class. In addition, given the 
limitations in our data, actors often access resources that are invisible to us. 
One may explain this catching up by the fact that some LF, whether in big or little 
ponds, have learned, over time, to use the resources of their organization more efficiently. By 
speculating beyond our data, one can hypothesize that measurements of the same networks in 
2004 would have shown inter-individual and inter-organizational interdependencies that 
would have become less disjointed for the LF in these elite. In other words, the LF would 
have learned to use to their own advantage the resources of their laboratory or the resources to 
which their laboratory gives access. In addition, one could interpret the results on upward 
mobility in table 4b from the point of view of status inconsistency and its potential motivating 
and resource giving effects. The odds of upward mobility are stronger for BFLP (resource 
giving effect) and LFBP (motivation). These groups are also slightly overrepresented in the 
upward mobility subgroup.  
Finally, strategy alone cannot account for the variations observed in the impact factor 
scores during the second period. Other factors have allowed certain little fish to catch up to 
the performance level of the BFBP. The reasons that their strategies are efficient have to do 
with the fact that they give access to resources, but they may also have to do with more 
general contextual causes, for example institutional ones. But our study does not have 
sufficient data to reliably control for the effect of these strategies relative to the effect of the 
evolution of the characteristics of the context in which the researchers worked. More 
systematic research would be necessary to meet our second expectation entirely and to 
confirm that the choice of one strategy for the management of interdependencies can 
influence, in a general and causal manner, catching up strategies in this multilevel and highly 
competitive environment. As acknowledged in the Hypothesis section, long-term ascendant 
trajectories cannot be explained solely by the individual catching up strategies. Career data, 
for example, should ideally be included in the discussion. There are reasons for which some 
individuals end up in the laboratory or context in which they end up, and these reasons are 
likely to be related to their performance. 
 
9. Meso-social explorations with multi-level analysis based on linked designs: limits and 
perspectives 
 
 In summary, this article presents an exploration of the meso-social order using a multi-
level structural approach observing two systems of superposed interdependencies, one inter-
organizational and the other inter-individual. This approach extends the principle of linked 
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design (Parcel at al., 1991) to structural analysis, which allows for this dual positioning. In 
effect, individual actors are positioned both according to their centrality in the network of 
inter-individual relationships and on the basis of the centrality of their organizations in the 
network of inter-organizational relationships. This dual positioning can add a causal factor in 
the explanation of action and performance measured at the individual level. It helps with the 
study of “duality” in social life (Breiger, 1974; Fararo and Doreian, 1984).   
 The knowledge of systems of multiple-resource and multi-level interdependencies, as 
well as the manner in which actors manage these interdependencies, adds, it seems to us, an 
underestimated dimension to multi-level reasoning in sociology. Using this knowledge for 
dual positioning in systems of superposed interdependencies allows us, especially when this 
positioning is articulated to actors’ strategies, to form new hypotheses about the relationship 
between position in structure, individual and collective action, and performance (measured at 
the individual level). In the case examined here, the knowledge of interpersonal relationships 
in the elite of this system, of relationships between the organizations of this system, and of the 
multi-level articulation of the two patterns, clarifies the social processes leading to high 
performances in an elite in scientific research.  
 Specifically we showed that, in this opportunity structure, non-central researchers 
(little fish) in our population used individualist strategies to catch up with the BFBP. The 
quasi-totality of those catching up, who make up the LFBP and the LFLP categories, or more 
generally the non-central researchers of this elite, can benefit from this strategy to improve 
their score in this system. In particular, the LFLP, who have the least access to the rare 
resources of their laboratories, greatly improve their chances with this individualist strategy, 
i.e. when they can afford not to align themselves entirely on the relational discipline imposed 
by their laboratory (or by the director of their laboratory). Therefore, it is not necessary, a 
priori, to be in a big pond (a large laboratory designated by elites as a central laboratory) in 
order to have a chance at catching up. Those whose impact factor scores have risen are 
generally researchers who are younger than the majority of the population. In our case study, 
the majority among them are hematologists, laboratory directors, and in Ile-de-France. Note, 
however, that some actors possessing resources are invisible to us because of their multiple 
memberships and because of the limits of our data in this regard. We have identified several 
LFLP who have a strong reputation in domains other than cancer research (they would 
certainly be BFBP in another specialty), which may also help explain their capacity to catch 
up. 
 Empirically, our illustration of this approach is obviously limited. First of all, our 
study only uses multi-level structural analysis in a minimal fashion, identifying most often a 
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single member in each organization (not including the representative of this organization, its 
director). This is an obvious difference with more classical multilevel analysis: by observing 
only one researcher per laboratory, we are not able to show and analyze variance existing at 
the level of the higher level units (the laboratories). The systematic identification of several 
members in each organization would have allowed for combined analyses with these more 
classic multi-level approaches, ones that do not attempt to bring to light systems of 
heterogeneous interdependencies and resource management strategies by actors in different 
opportunity structures. Therefore, the relationships between the two methods remain to be 
examined in a more systematic manner.  
Secondly, we no not have the data needed for a more systematic comprehension of the 
complementary nature of individual and organizational resources that contributes to the 
triggering of multi-level processes. Without longitudinal data, it is difficult to understand the 
extent to which the centrality of an organization in an inter-organizational network and the 
centrality of an individual actor in an inter-individual network mutually construct themselves. 
The articulation of both multi-level and dynamic structural analyses remains therefore to be 
explored, as in the direction pioneered by Snijders and Baerveldt (2003). Thirdly, our 
multilevel approach through linked design creates units of analyses at two levels (BFBP, etc.); 
much remains to be done to generalize and systematize this approach, as in the direction 
shown by Robins et al. (2005) or in the spirit of Fararo and Doreian (1984) for more 
numerous superpositions.  
Finally, our results suggest that the position of an organization in the inter-
organizational network is still more important in terms of attaining high levels of performance 
than the position of individual members in the network of the elite in the examined field or 
system. However, this result raises the question of how actors made it, in the first place, into 
the central organizations dominating these systems of interdependencies, upstream of the 
processes observed here. The only response to this question lies in the articulation of data of 
multi-level networks with other types of data – on the trajectories and careers of actors in the 
“small worlds” examined, and more generally at the meso-social level. This means, again, 
that other influences (than strategies) on impact factors should not, ideally, be left out of the 
discussion and the analysis. Beyond the big fish – big pond categorizations, empirical 
analyses testing their importance for performance need to be combined with additional data in 
order to provide strong evidence for causal effects.  
In spite of all these limitations, this analysis of multi-level networks seems therefore 
adapted to certain types of questions that sociologists ask when they try to combine both 
individual and contextual factors in order to estimate the likelihood of an individual or a 
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group to adopt a given behavior or to reach a given level of performance. More generally, this 
approach explores a complex meso-social level of accumulation, of appropriation and of the 
sharing of multiple resources. This level, still poorly known, is difficult to observe without a 
structural approach. If it is true that contemporary society is an “organizational society” 
(Presthus, 1962; Coleman, 1982; Perrow, 1991) –in the sense that action and performance 
measured at the individual level strongly depend of the capacity of the actor to construct and 
to use organizations as instruments, and thus to manage his/her interdependencies at different 
levels in a strategic manner–,then the study of interdependencies jointly at the inter-individual 
and the inter-organizational level is important for numerous sets of problems. We should not 
overlook the domains of application for this approach in sociology, in particular for the study 
of relationships between organizations, careers, social stratification and inequalities.  
In particular, this approach will reach its full potential when longitudinal observations 
at both levels of analyses will be available. In effect, in this paper we insisted on the effects of 
dual positioning on performance measured at the individual level, as well as on the 
contribution of specific strategies for relative catching up in a specific milieu and underlying 
opportunity structure. However, this approach also opens up research on institutional change 
and the evolution and/or redesign of inter-organizational systems and opportunity structures. 
Structural linked design and dual positioning will allow to evaluate the importance of inter-
individual and inter-organisational networks of an elite when the latter attempts to redesign an 
institutional setting that it controls or represents, for example when organizational mergers are 
considered. Elites are often involved in power struggles that generate great uncertainties about 
such changes. The dynamic examination of multiple positionnings provided by structural 
linked designs should thus allow to anticipate or evaluate the respective capacities and 
strategies of different segments of an elite to compete for control of institutional change and 
redesign. 
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Table 1  
Medians and percentages for the variables characterising the population 
of 93 researchers and laboratories which participated in the study 
       
Researchers   Laboratories  
Variables Median  %   Variables  Median            % 
Indegree centrality 5,2     Indegree centrality 2,75   
  
  Outdegree centrality 2   
  Size 26   
  
Environment 
  Environment    
  Sources of funding   
Outdegree centrality 4,1 
  
  French research funds 12,5   
Impact factor 84   French non research funds 32   
Number of papers 23,5   Public or private foreign institutions 0   
Age 48   European funds 3   
Laboratory directors 52   Institutional budget  26   
  
  Geographical site:   
  Île de France 52 
    
Specialties   Specialties 
Fundamental recherche 44   Fundamental research 58 
Laboratory research 45   Laboratory research 43 
Hematology 28   Hematology 20 
Solid tumors 45   Solid tumors  33 
Surgery 8   Surgery 3 
Public health 15   Public health 12 
            
Diplomas   
 
 
MD 70    
Pharmacy 4    
PhD in sciences 44    
Agregation 27    
         
Current status    
Research director 29    
Researcher 7    
Technical engineer 3    
Head of hospital department 45    
Head of clinique 1    
Instructor 81    
Works in hospital 17    
Works in hospital and univ. 
Professor 54    
University professor 7    
Scientific committee 73    
Editorial board 51    
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Table 2 : Density table for intra- and inter-class relationships in the advice networks among researchers. 
 
 
Densities Big Fish in Big Pond
Big Fish in 
Little Pond
Little Fish in 
Big Pond
Little Fish in 
Little Pond
Big Fish in Big Pond 0,16 0,15 0,04 0,03
Big Fish in Little 
Pond 0,11 0,13 0,03 0,04
Little Fish in Big 
Pond 0,07 0,05 0,03 0,01
Little Fish in Little 
Pond 0,05 0,05 0,02 0,03  
 
Intra-class densities are indicated in grey. They decrease with the centrality of the laboratory and with the centrality of the researchers. 
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Table 3 : Distribution of the 93 researchers/laboratories per class and strategy 
Strategies Classes 
Frequency 
  Percentage 
Row percentage 
Class 1 –Big Fish 
–Big Pond 
Class 2 –Big Fish-
Little Pond 
Class 3 –Little 
Fish-Big Pond 
Class 4 – Little 
Fish-Little Pond Total 
Column percentage 
Strategy A - Independent 
10 4 11 16 41 
11 4 12 17 44 
24 10 27 39 
  
31 25 50 70 
Strategy B - Individualist 
9 2 5 5 21 
10 2 5,5 5,5 23 
43 9 24 24 
  
28 12 23 22 
Strategy C -Collectivist 
9 6 3 2 20 
10 6 3 2 21 
45 30 15 10 
  
28 38 13,5 8 
Strategy D - Fusional 
4 4 3 0 11 
4 4 3 0 12 
36 36 27 0 
  
13 25 13,5 0 
Total 
32 16 22 23 93 
34 17 24 25 100 
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Table 4a : Means of standardized impact factor scores for all researchers at time t1 and t2 according to class and 
strategy 
                     
 Class 1 BFBP Class 2 BFLP Class 3 LFBP Class 4 LFLP Means of strategies 
  t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R 
Strategy 1 
"Independent" 0,5 0,66 10  +  -0,35 -0,45 4 - 0,05 -0,22 11 - -0,43 -0,44 16 - -0,06 -0,11 41 - 
Strategy 2 
"Individualist" 0,55 0,45 9 - -0,01 -0,77 2 - 0,05 0,48 5 + -0,30 0,10 5 + 0,17 0,25 21 + 
Strategy 3 
"Collectivist" 0,26 0,06 9 - -0,34 -0,05 6 + -0,40 -0,29 3 + 0,47 -0,13 2 - 0,002 -0,04 20 - 
Strategy 4 
"Fusional" 0 0,03 4 + -0,07 0,28 4 + -0,24 -0,38 3 -     0 0 -0,09 0,01 11 + 
Means of 
classes 0,38 0,35 32 - -0,23 -0,15 16 + -0,05 -0,09 22 - -0,32 -0,29 23 + 0 93   
                     
t1=first period, t2=second period, N=number of researchers in that category, R=result. Distributions of scores of impact 
factors are standardized for easier comparisons. 
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Table 4b: Standardized means of impact factor scores for the sub-population of researchers whose scores increased 
between periods 1 and 2, according to class and strategy  
 Class 1 BFBP Class 2 BFLP Class 3 LFBP Class 4 LFLP Means of strategies 
 t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R 
Strategy 1 
"Independent" 0,94 1 5  +  -0,47 -0,42 2 + -0,52 -0,41 6 + -0,53 -0,55 6 - -0,13 -0,08 19 + 
Strategy 2 
"Individualist" 0,57 0,54 4 -     0   -0,04 0,26 3 + 0,11 0,13 4 + 0,23 0,31 11 + 
Strategy 3 
"Collectivist" 0,35 0,23 3 - 0,02 0,06 3 + -0,51 -0,27 2 + -0,32 -0,76 1 - -0,02 -0,04 9 - 
Strategy ' 
"Fusional" -0,56 -0,44 2 + 0,48 0,09 4 - -0,59 -0,95 1 -     0   0,03 -0,21 7 - 
Means of 
classes 0,49 0,5 14 + 0,11 -0,03 9 - -0,40 -0,27 12 + 
-
0,280 
-
0,324 11 - 0 46   
                     
                     
t1=first period, t2=second period, N=number of researchers in that category, R=result. All researchers in this table have on 
average higher scores during period 2 than during period 1. Scores higher than 0 correspond to scores of researchers who 
have the best scores among all those who saw their scores increase over the two periods.  
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Table 4c : Standardized means of impact factor scores for the sub-population of researchers whose scores decreased between 
periods 1 et 2, according to class and strategy  
 Class 1 BFBP Class 2 BFLP Class 3 LFBP Class 4 LFLP Means of strategies 
 t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R t1 t2  N R 
Strategy 1 
"Independent" 0,2 0,11 5  -  -0,33 -0,6 2 - 0,94 0,15 5 - -0,71 -0,36 10 + -0,09 -0,15 22 - 
Strategy 2 
"Individualist" 0,6 0,45 5 - -0,61 -0,94 2 - 0,53 0,96 2 + -0,48 -0,97 1 - 0,23 0,13 10 - 
Strategy 3 
"Collectivist" 0 0,05 6 + -0,84 -0,29 3 + 0,26 -0,58 1 - 1,50 1,03 1 - -0,06 0 11 + 
Strategy 4 
"Fusional" 0,62 0,96 2 +     0   -0,41 0,16 2 +     0   0,1 0,56 4 + 
Means of 
classes 0,2916 0,2828 18 - -0,631 -0,568 7 + 0,526 0,245 10 0 -0,508 -0,297 12 + 0 47   
                     
                     
t1=first period, t2=second period, N=number of researchers in that category, R=result. 
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 Figure 1: Example of visualization of multilevel networks in French cancer research (1999).   
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Figure 2: Graphs of intra-class advice ties (i.e. among members of each class). 
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Figure 3: Graphs of inter-class advice ties 
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Figure 4: Boxplots of impact factors by class for the first period 
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Figure 5: Types of overlap between the relationships among researchers and the relationships among laboratories (based 
on linked design) 
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Figure 6 : Reconstitution of strategies of actors 
A :Independent, B :Individualist, C :Collectivist, D :Fusional 
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Figure 7: Proximities of classes and strategies 
Correspondance Analysis of Table 3 (weighted counts) 
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Figure 8: Which catching up strategies for actors who are not BFBP?  
Correspondence Analysis of Table 4a (weighted counts) 
 
